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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between parties' patience and continuation values in legislative
bargaining. We consider the legislative bargaining game without assuming common discount factor.
In the game, it is observed a seemingly paradoxical phenomenon that more patient party obtains
less continuation value than less patient party. Also, we show that in some cases, a party's
continuation value decreases as she marginally becomes more patient. These seemingly paradoxical
results come from the role of patience dierent from ordinary bargaining games. The role is unique
to the majority rule in the legislative bargaining.
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1 Introduction
There have been some studies that analyze the bargaining problem as a non-cooperative game,
e.g., Rubinstein (1982), Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986), Gul (1989), and so on. Among
the studies, Rubinstein presented a plausible and simple extensive form game and meaningful
implications. Rubinsteinesque approach has been applied to many research elds, e.g., political
economy, labor economics,
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and so on.
In political economy, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) modeled the bargaining in the legislature in
Rubinsteinesque way. In their legislative bargaining model, there exists more than three legislators.
First of all, the nature selects the proposer of policy from among the legislators. The selected
legislator proposes a policy and the policy is put on the vote. If a majority of the legislators
votes for the proposal, the proposed policy is implemented. Otherwise, the legislative procedure
is repeated.
Baron and Ferejohn's approach is one of the most powerful tool in political economy and
has been applied to various situations. For example, Baron (1991) analyzed government formation
procedure by using the legislative bargaining model, and Diermeier and Fedderson (1998) explained
cohesion in legislatures under the condence vote system in Baron and Ferejohnesque way.
As mentioned above, Baron and Ferejohn's approach has been often used in political economy.
However, a very important nature of the model has not been studied. It is how legislators' patience
aects the equilibrium expected payos. In Baron and Ferejohn and other literatures, common
discount factor is assumed. And it has not investigated how the dierence and the change of
legislators' discount factors have eect on the equilibrium payos.
In Rubinstein, discount factors play signicantly important role. So, the role of discount
factors in Baron and Ferejohn's legislative bargaining model ought to be studied. In the legislative
bargaining model, do discount factors play the same role as in Rubinstein's model or dierent role?
If discount factors play dierent role, how is the role? The purpose of this paper is to answer these
questions.
This paper may also be related to two recent papers, Haan and Kooreman (2003) and Piccione
and Rubinstein (2003).
Haan and Kooreman present a paradoxical phenomenon in the direct democracy. They for-
mulate the situation that two alternatives are put to the majority vote and assume that there is
the cost to vote and the voters can abstain. They prove that, if the cost is suÆciently high, the
alternative supported by the minority wins with greater probability than what is supported by the
majority.
Piccione and Rubinstein investigate the situation that each player can appropriate wealth of
a weaker player than she. They assume that the stronger a player is, the more her initial wealth
is and that each player must pay the cost to appropriate a weaker player's wealth. It is proved
that, if the cost is suÆciently low, in any equilibrium, there exists a player who is weaker and gets
greater payo than the second strongest player.
In these models, seemingly desirable properties, i.e., the majority support and the strength,
are not necessarily bliss. Also in our paper, it may be the case. There may exist a party who is
less patient and gets greater payo than other party. If so, player's patience, which seems to be
desirable in bargaining, is not bliss.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the political environment as a exten-
sive form game, Section 3 denes the equilibrium concept employed in the paper and proves the
existence of equilibria, Section 4 and Section 5 analyze the relationship between parties' patience
and continuation values, Section 6 presents two numerical examples, and Section 7 concludes the
paper.
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For example, Shaked and Sutton (1984) explained involuntary unemployment by using the bargaining model.
2
2 Political environment
We consider the following political environment, which is the same as Baron and Ferejohn's model
except for noncommon discount factors.
There exist three parties in the legislature. Label the parties 1, 2, and 3. Let N  f1; 2; 3g, i.e.,
N denote the set of parties. We assume that every member of each party have the same preference,
and that no party has a majority of seats and any coalition of two parties has a majority of seats.
The parties make a split-the-pie bargain, i.e., they decide how they distribute political rent
by bargaining. We assume that the political rent is a total of 1. We call how to split the rent
policy. Let X denote the set of policies: X is the simplex in 3-dimensional Euclidean space, i.e.,
X 

x 2 [0; 1]
3
j 1  x = 1
	
.
The bargaining proceeds in accordance with the following timing. (i) Nature selects a proposer
i from the set N of parties in the legislature with probability
1
3
. (ii) The selected proposer i
proposes how to split the rent, i.e., a policy x 2 X . (iii) Every party j 2 N votes on the proposed
policy x simultaneously. Then, if a majority of legislators votes for the proposal, the proposal is
implemented and the game ends. Otherwise, the procedure is repeated from (i). Note that by the
assumption on legislators' preferences and each party's share of the seats, a majority of parties
votes for the proposal if and only if a majority of legislators votes for the proposal.
Each party's payo is the rent distributed to herself and each party discounts future rent. Thus,
party i's payo is equal to Æ
t 1
i
x
i
when a policy x  (x
k
)
k2N
is implemented after the tth vote,
where Æ
i
2 (0; 1) is i's discount factor.
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Figure 1: The game tree of the legislative bargaining
According to Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), we can formally describe the game dened above
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as
a(Æ) = hN;H; P; f; (u
i
(Æ
i
))
i2N
i
with Æ  (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 (0; 1)
3
, where each component of a(Æ) has the following property. (i)
N  f1; 2; 3g is the set of players (parties). (ii) H is the set of histories, which is dened as follows.
Let
A  f(a; a; a); (a; a; r); (a; r; a); (r; a; a)g;
R  f(r; r; r); (r; r; a); (r; a; r); (a; r; r)g;
and
X  fx 2 (0; 1)
3
j x  1 = 1g:
We dene Z
t
as
Z
t
 f(p

;x

; v

)
t
=1
j [8 2 f1; : : : ; tg : p

2 N ^ x

2 X ]; [8 2 f1; : : : ; t  1g : v

2 R]; v
t
2 Ag:
Let Z 
S
1
t=1
Z
t
. Z is the set of terminal histories. Finally, we dene H as H  fh j 9h
0
: (h; h
0
) 2
Zg. (iii) P : H n Z !  is the player function, where  
S
4
k=1
f(
l
)
k
l=1
2 (N [ f0g)
k
j 8i; j 2
f1; : : : ; kg : i 6= j ) 
i
6= 
j
g (0 denotes the nature). P is dened as
P (h) =
8
>
<
>
:
L(h) if h = (h
0
; p) for some h
0
and p 2 N
(1; 2; 3) if h = (h
0
;x) for some h
0
and x 2 X
0 otherwise
for h 2 H n Z, where L(h) is the last element of h.
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(iv) For h such that P (h) = 0, f(h) is the
probability measure on N . Let f(h)(fpg) 
1
3
for p 2 N . (v) u
i
(Æ
i
) : Z ! R is player i's 2 N
payo function (Æ
i
2 (0; 1) reects player i's time preference). Let
u
i
(Æ
i
)(z
t
)  Æ
t 1
i
x
t
i
for t 2 f1; : : : ;1g and z
t
 (p

;x

; v

)
t
=1
2 Z
t
with x

 (x

i
)
i2N
.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Equilibrium concept
In this paper, we use the behavior strategy dened below.
Denition 1 Let i 2 N . 
i
is party i's behavior strategy in a(Æ) if 
i
(h
i
) is a probability measure
on A
i
(h
i
) for all h
i
2 H
i
, where H
i
and A
i
are dened as in the footnote 2.
We denote the set of party i's2 N behavior strategies in a(Æ) by 
i
. Note that 
i
is not dependent
on Æ. Let  
Q
i2N

i
.
Let
^
H() be dened as
^
H()  fh 2 H j 9h
0
2 H : h = (h
0
; )g for  2 N [ X . According to
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), f
^
H()g
2N[X
is the payo-relevant history.
3
We dene `Markovian'
as follows.
Denition 2 Let i 2 N . Party i's behavior strategy 
i
2 
i
in a(Æ) is Markovian if 
i
satises
8h
i
; h
0
i
2
^
H() \H
i
: 
i
(h
i
) = 
i
(h
0
i
) for all  2 N [X .
2
Take any i 2 N and any h
i
2 fh 2 H n Z j P (h) = i _ P (h) = (1; 2; 3)g  H
i
. H
i
is the set of histories which reach
player i's node. Let
A
i
(h
i
) 
(
X if P (h
i
) = i
fa; rg if P (h
i
) = (1; 2; 3):
Player i chooses her action from A
i
(h
i
).
3
f
^
H()g
2N[X
is a partition of the set of histories which reach the node but the chance.
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`Markovian' means `stationary.' We denote party i's continuation value induced by a Markovian
behavior strategy prole  in the game a(Æ) by V
Æ
i
()
The equilibrium concept employed in the paper is dened as follows.
Denition 3 A behavior strategy prole   (
i
)
i2N
2  in a(Æ) is honestly voting Markov
perfect equilibrium (honestly voting MPE) in a(Æ) if  satises the following properties.
(i)  is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a(Æ).
(ii) 
i
is Markovian for all i 2 N .
(iii) For any i 2 N , any x 2 X and any h 2
^
H(x), 
i
(h)(fag) = 1 if e
i
 x  Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() and

i
(h)(frg) = 1 if e
i
 x < Æ
i
V
Æ
i
(), with (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
)  Æ.
Properties (i) and (ii) correspond to `MPE' and property (iii) corresponds to `honestly voting.'
Since any proposal can be passed in equilibrium without `honestly voting' property, we need
`honestly voting' property. We denote the set of honestly voting MPE in a(Æ) by E
Æ
. For Æ 
(Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 (0; 1)
3
and fi; j; kg = N , let E
Æ
i;j;k
: f=; >g
2
! 2
E
Æ
be dened as
E
Æ
i;j;k
(R;R
0
) 

 2 E
Æ
j Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() R Æ
j
V
Æ
j
() R
0
Æ
k
V
Æ
k
()
	
for (R;R
0
) 2 f=; >g
2
. For instance, E
Æ
1;2;3
(=;=) represents the set of honestly voting MPE  in
a(Æ) such that
Æ
1
V
Æ
1
() = Æ
2
V
Æ
2
() = Æ
3
V
Æ
3
();
i.e., every party's discounted continuation value is equal.
3.2 A convenient lemma
For Æ  (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 (0; 1)
3
, h
0
2 fh 2 H n Z j P (h) = 0g  H
0
and  2 , we dene a game
a
S
(h
0
; ; Æ) as
a
S
(h
0
; ; Æ)  hN;H
S
; P
S
; f
S
; (u
S
i
(h
0
; ; Æ
i
))
i2N
i;
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where (i)
H
S
 fh j 9h
0
: (h; h
0
) 2 Z
S
g
with
Z
S
= f(p;x; v) j p 2 N;x 2 X; v 2 fa; rg
3
g;
(ii) P
S
: H
S
n Z
S
!
S
4
k=1
f(
l
)
k
h=l
2 (N [ f0g)
k
j 8i; j 2 f1; : : : ; kg : i 6= j ) 
i
6= 
j
g is dened
as
P
S
(h) =
8
>
<
>
:
h if h 2 N
(1; 2; 3) if h = (p;x) for some p 2 N and x 2 X
0 otherwise
for h 2 H
S
n Z
S
;
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(iii) f
S
is a probability measure on N , where f
S
(fpg) =
1
3
for all p 2 N ; (iv)
u
S
i
(h
0
; ; Æ
i
) : Z
S
! R for i 2 N is dened as
u
S
i
(h
0
; ; Æ
i
)(p;x; v) =
^
V
i
((h
0
; p;x; v); ; Æ
i
)
for (p;x; v) 2 Z
S
, where
^
V
i
(h
0
; ; Æ) is i's expected payo in a(Æ) calculated by  and f conditional
on h
0
for i 2 N , Æ 2 (0; 1)
3
, h
0
2 H and  2 . We call the game a
S
(h
0
; ; Æ) segmented game of
a(Æ) at h
0
under .
We show the following lemma to calculate equilibria.
4
N , H
S
, P
S
, f
S
and u
S
i
(h; ; Æ) are the set of players, the set of histories, the player function, the probability measure
on the set of proposers (parties), and player i's payo function, respectively.
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Take any i 2 N and any h
i
2 fh 2 H
S
n Z
S
j P
S
(h) = i _ P
S
(h) = (1; 2; 3)g  H
S
i
. Let
A
S
i
(h
i
) 
(
X if P
S
(h
i
) = i
fa; rg if P
S
(h
i
) = (1; 2; 3):
Player i chooses her action from A
S
i
(h
i
).
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Lemma 1 Take any Æ  (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 (0; 1)
3
and  2 .  is a subgame perfect equilibrium in
a(Æ) if and only if for any h
0
2 H
0
,  forms a subgame perfect equilibrium in a
S
(h
0
; ; Æ).
Proof. See Appendix A. Q.E.D.
This lemma is a variation of One Deviation Principle.
3.3 A necessary and suÆcient condition for E
Æ
i;j;k
(R;R
0
) 6= ;
We want to seek a necessary and suÆcient condition for E
Æ
i;j;k
(R;R
0
) 6= ; for fi; j; kg = N and
(R;R
0
) 2 f=; >g
2
. For the following arguments, let 
i;j;k
(R;R
0
) denote the set of Æ necessary and
suÆcient for E
Æ
i;j;k
(R;R
0
) 6= ;. Throughout this subsection and Appendix B, let x
l
m
denote an
amount of rent which proposer l distributes to party m. In the following arguments, we implicitly
use Lemma 1.
We want to seek a necessary and suÆcient condition for E
Æ
i;j;k
(=;=) 6= ;. Suppose that
E
Æ
i;j;k
(=;=) 6= ;. Take any strategy prole  2 E
Æ
i;j;k
(=;=). Let (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
)  Æ. Since Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() =
Æ
j
V
Æ
j
() = Æ
k
V
Æ
k
(), in , every party h 2 fi; j; kg (i) votes for a policy such that x
g
h
 Æ
h
V
Æ
h
()
and against a policy such that x
g
h
< Æ
h
V
Æ
h
() for g 2 fi; j; kg, and (ii) proposes a policy such that
 
x
h
h
; x
h
h+1
; x
h
h+2

=
 
1  Æ
h+1
V
Æ
h+1
(); Æ
h+1
V
Æ
h+1
(); 0

6
with probability r
h
and a policy such that
 
x
h
h
; x
h
h+1
; x
h
h+2

=
 
1  Æ
h+2
V
Æ
h+2
(); 0; Æ
h+2
V
Æ
h+2
()

with probability 1  r
h
.
7
Hence, each party h's 2 fi; j; kg continuation value is as follows:
V
Æ
h
() =
1
3

r
h
 
1  Æ
h+1
V
Æ
h+1
()

+ (1  r
h
)
 
1  Æ
h+2
V
Æ
h+2
()
	
+
1
3
(1  r
h+1
) Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() +
1
3
r
h+2
Æ
h
V
Æ
h
():
Moreover, utilizing Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() = Æ
j
V
Æ
j
() = Æ
k
V
Æ
k
(), we obtain
8h 2 fi; j; kg : V
Æ
h
() =
Æ
h+1
Æ
h+2
Æ
1
Æ
2
+ Æ
2
Æ
3
+ Æ
3
Æ
1
(1)
and
(r
i
; r
j
; r
k
) =

 
1
Æ
i
+
2
Æ
j
 
1
Æ
k
+ ; 
2
Æ
i
+
1
Æ
j
+
1
Æ
k
+ ; 

 r () : (2)
Thus,
9 2 R : r () 2 [0; 1]
3
must hold. Therefore,
8h 2 fi; j; kg :  1 
1
Æ
h
+
1
Æ
h+1
 
2
Æ
h+2
 1
must be satised. This expression is a necessary and suÆcient condition for E
Æ
i;j;k
(=;=) 6= ;.
Hence, we obtain the following lemma.
6
Throughout the paper, on an index representing a party, for i 2 f1; 2; 3g, we regard j as identical with i if i  j
(mod 3).
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For proposer h 2 fi; j; kg, it is not desirable that a proposal does not pass. The reason is as follows. If a proposal
does not pass, proposer h's expected payo is equal to Æ
h
V
Æ
h
(). And we have

1  Æ
h+1
V
Æ
h+1
()

  Æ
h
V
Æ
h
() > 1 

Æ
h
V
Æ
h
() + Æ
h+1
V
Æ
h+1
() + Æ
h+2
V
Æ
h+2
()

> 1 

V
Æ
h
() + V
Æ
h+1
() + V
Æ
h+2
()

= 0:
It is the case with the following subsections that rejection of a proposal is not desirable for a proposer.
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Lemma 2 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Then,

i;j;k
(=;=) =

(Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 (0; 1)
3
j 8h 2 fi; j; kg :  1 
1
Æ
h
+
1
Æ
h+1
 
2
Æ
h+2
 1

: (3)
Proof. By the argument above. Q.E.D.
This lemma mensions that, when all parties are as patient as one another, there exist equilibria
such that all parties have the same discounted continuation value.
Throughout the paper, we use binary relations, ,

=
and ', on (0; 1) dened as follows:
x y , 3

1
x
 
1
y

<  1;
x

=
y ,  1  3

1
x
 
1
y

 1;
and
x ' y ,  1 
1
x
 
1
y
 1
for x; y 2 (0; 1).
Lemma 2 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Then,
8(Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
i;j;k
(=;=) : Æ
i
' Æ
j
' Æ
k
' Æ
i
:
Proof. Almost obvious. Q.E.D.
The same logic as above yields the following lemmata.
Lemma 3 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Then,

i;j;k
(=; >) =

(Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 (0; 1)
3
j  1  3

1
Æ
i
 
1
Æ
j

 1 ^
1
Æ
i
+
1
Æ
j
 
2
Æ
k
<  1

: (4)
Proof. By the argument in Subsection B.1. Q.E.D.
This lemma mentions that, when two parties are as patient as one another and much more patient
than the other party, there exist equilibria such that two more patient parties have the same
discounted continuation value greater than the other party's value. Lemma 3 implies the following
corollary.
Corollary 2 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Then,
8(Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
i;j;k
(=; >) : Æ
i

=
Æ
j
^ Æ
i
 Æ
k
^ Æ
j
 Æ
k
:
Proof. Almost obvious. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Then,

i;j;k
(>;=) =

(Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 (0; 1)
3
j  1  3

1
Æ
j
 
1
Æ
k

 1 ^
1
Æ
j
+
1
Æ
k
 
2
Æ
i
> 1

: (5)
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Proof. By the argument in Subsection B.2. Q.E.D.
This lemma mentions that, when two parties are as patient as one another and much less patient
than the other party, there exist equilibria such that two less patient parties have the same dis-
counted continuation value smaller than the other party's value. Lemma 4 implies the following
corollary.
Corollary 3 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Then,
8(Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
i;j;k
(>;=) : Æ
i
 Æ
j
^ Æ
i
 Æ
k
^ Æ
j

=
Æ
k
:
Proof. Almost obvious. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Then,

i;j;k
(>;>) =

(Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 (0; 1)
3
j 3

1
Æ
i
 
1
Æ
j

<  1 ^ 3

1
Æ
j
 
1
Æ
k

<  1

: (6)
Proof. By the argument in Subsection B.3. Q.E.D.
This lemma mentions that, when party i is much more patient than party j and party j is much
more patient than party k, there exist equilibria such that party i's discounted continuation value
is greater than party j's and party j's is greater than party k's. Lemma 5 implies the following
corollary.
Corollary 4 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Then,
8(Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
i;j;k
(>;>) : Æ
i
 Æ
j
 Æ
k
:
Proof. Almost obvious. Q.E.D.
3.4 Some properties of 
i;j;k
(R;R
0
)s and the existence of equilibria
Let
D 
n

i;j;k
(R;R
0
) j fi; j; kg = N ^ (R;R
0
) 2 f=; >g
2
o
:
Then, we show some properties of 
i;j;k
(R;R
0
)s as the following lemmata.
Lemma 6 8 2 D :  6= ;.
Proof. By Lemmata from 2 to 5. Q.E.D.
The lemma means the following. There are thirteen cases to be considered: Æ
1
V
Æ
1
() = Æ
2
V
Æ
2
() =
Æ
3
V
Æ
3
(), Æ
1
V
Æ
1
() = Æ
2
V
Æ
2
() > Æ
3
V
Æ
3
(), and so on (). Take any case. There exists a honestly
voting MPE satisfying the case for some Æ.
For a set S, we denote the cardinal number of S by card S.
Lemma 7 card D = 13 and 8 f;
0
g  D :  \
0
= ;.
Proof. By Lemmata from 2 to 5. Q.E.D.
According to the lemma, in a game a(Æ), if there exists a honestly voting MPE satisfying a case
in (), there exists no honestly voting MPE satisfying the other cases in ().
Lemma 8
S
2D
 = (0; 1)
3
.
8
Proof. See Appendix C. Q.E.D.
This lemma means that there exists a honestly voting MPE in a(Æ) for all Æ 2 (0; 1)
3
.
The lemmata above yield the following proposition on the existence of equilibria.
Proposition 1 Take any Æ 2 (0; 1)
3
. There uniquely exist(s) payo-relevant honestly voting MPE
in a(Æ), i.e., (i) there exist(s) honestly voting MPE in a(Æ), and (ii) for any honestly voting MPE
in a(Æ), equal continuation value prole is achieved.
Remark. Take any Æ 2 (0; 1)
3
. The set of honestly voting MPE of a(Æ) is E
Æ
i;j;k
(R;R
0
), where
(i; j; k; R;R
0
) satises 
i;j;k
(R;R
0
) 3 Æ. 
Proof. By Lemmata 7 and 8 and the arguments in Subsection 3.3 and Appendix B. Q.E.D.
4 Parties' patience and continuation value (I)
In this section, we investigate whether or not more patient party obtains a larger equilibrium payo
than less patient party or not.
4.1 The result
The result is summarized by Proposition 2. This proposition is one of the two main results in this
paper.
Proposition 2 Suppose that fi

; i

; ig = N . Take any Æ  (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 (0; 1)
3
such that Æ
i

> Æ
i

.
Take any honestly voting MPE  in a(Æ). Then,

Æ 2 
i

;i;i

(=; >) ^ Æ
i

<
1
2

1 + Æ
i

 
Æ
i

Æ
i

(7)
_

Æ 2 
i

;i;i

(>;>) ^ Æ
i

<
Æ
i
3  Æ
i

(8)
_

Æ 2 
i;i

;i

(>;>) ^ Æ
i

<
2
3
Æ
i


(9)
, V
Æ
i

() > V
Æ
i

(); (10)

Æ 2 
i

;i;i

(=; >) ^ Æ
i

=
1
2

1 + Æ
i

 
Æ
i

Æ
i

(11)
_

Æ 2 
i

;i;i

(>;>) ^ Æ
i

=
Æ
i
3  Æ
i

(12)
_

Æ 2 
i;i

;i

(>;>) ^ Æ
i

=
2
3
Æ
i


(13)
, V
Æ
i

() = V
Æ
i

(); (14)
and

Æ 2 
i

;i;i

(=; >) ^ Æ
i

>
1
2

1 + Æ
i

 
Æ
i

Æ
i

(15)
_

Æ 2 
i

;i;i

(>;>) ^ Æ
i

>
Æ
i
3  Æ
i

(16)
_

Æ 2 
i;i

;i

(>;>) ^ Æ
i

>
2
3
Æ
i


(17)
_ Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(=;=) [
i

;i

;i
(=; >) [
i;i

;i

(>;=) (18)
_ Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(>;=) [
i

;i

;i
(>;>) (19)
, V
Æ
i

() < V
Æ
i

(): (20)
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Remark. Take any expression from among expressions (7)-(9), (11)-(13) and (15)-(19). Then,
there exists Æ which satises the expression. 
Proof. By Lemmata from 9 to 12 in Appendix D and Lemma 8. Q.E.D.
Thus, more patient party obtains a larger equilibrium payo if the expressions from (7) to (9)
hold, while more patient party obtains a smaller equilibrium payo if the expressions from (15) to
(19) hold. In the following subsections, we shall oer an explanation why this seemingly counter-
intuitive result is obtained.
4.2 Three eects of parties' patience on the continuation values
Parties' patience has three eects on their equilibrium continuation values of the game.
Two eects of them are more important than the other. We call one of the two eects shut-out
eect and another bargaining-power eect. Especially the shut-out eect is important and does
not appear in ordinary bargaining models.
For the rst time, we consider the shut-out eect. In the legislative bargaining, a proposal
passes by the majority approval. So, a proposer wants to obtain the approval of only one non-
proposer party. Moreover, since a patient party tends to want many rents, the more patient
non-proposer party's approval to the proposal is costly for the proposer. Thus, it is natural that
the proposer intends to win the approval of the less patient non-proposer party. Hence, a patient
party is likely to obtain no rent when she is not a proposer. She is, what is called, shut out by
the proposer. So, we call this eect of parties' patience shut-out eect. This eect comes from the
majority voting rule
8
and is not familiar in ordinary bargaining models.
On the other hand, the bargaining-power eect can be divided into two eects. We call one
of them recipient's-bargaining-power eect and another proposer's-bargaining-power eect. The
recipient's-bargaining-power eect is explained as follows. Consider a non-proposer party which
is distributed positive rents to. As long as she is less costly for the proposer than another non-
proposer party, the more patient she is, the more the rents that the proposer distributes to her
are. In other words, locally, the more patient she is, the stronger her bargaining power against
the proposer is, thus she obtains more rents. The proposer's-bargaining-power eect is explained
as follows. The proposer distributes positive rents to less costly non-proposer party to win her
approval. Naturally, the rents to win less costly party's approval is smaller as she is less patient.
Thus, the proposer's rents is greater as the less costly party is less patient.
The other eect is, so to speak, direct eect, which comes from discounting each party's rent
implemented in the future. But parties' patience actually has no direct eect on the continuation
values since the policy is implemented in the rst-round bargaining in every honestly voting MPE.
Generally speaking, the shut-out eect is advantageous to less patient party and the bargaining-
power eect is to more patient party.
4.3 The intuition of Proposition 2
The intuition of this proposition can be explained by using the shut-out eect and the bargaining-
power eect.
Roughly speaking, we can explain the proposition as follows.
In case Æ
i

is much smaller than Æ
i

and Æ
i
(the expressions (7)-(9), (11)-(13) and (15)-(17)), i

is superior to i

in terms of the shut-out eect and inferior in terms of the bargaining-power eect.
If Æ
i

is extremely small (the expressions from (7) to (9)), party i

's bargainig power is extremely
weak, thus party i

's advantage in terms of the bargaining-power eect is very signicant and so
dominates party i

's advantage in terms of the shut-out eect. Hence, if Æ
i

is extremely small,
party i

's continuation value is greater than party i

's, and otherwise, it is smaller.
8
We discuss this point in detail in Subsection 4.4.
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In case Æ
i

and Æ
i

have similar value (the expression (18)), party i

is superior to party i

in
terms of the shut-out eect just in a probability sense. So, we can state that Æ
i

is a little greater
than Æ
i

and i

is a little superior to party i

in terms of the shut-out eect. By the interaction
between the discount factors and the shut-out eect, in fact, party i

's discounted continuation
value is equal to party i

's, and so party i

is equivalent to party i

in terms of the bargaining-
power eect. To sum up, we can conclude that party i

's continuation value is greater than party
i

's.
In case Æ
i

is much greater than Æ
i

and Æ
i
, and Æ
i

is not much smaller than Æ
i
(the expression
(19)), party i

is shut out by both party i

and party i. So, party i

is inferior to party i

in
terms of the shut-out eect. Obviously, the party which party i

distributes positive rents to is as
patient as the party which party i

does. Thus, party i

is equivalent to party i

in terms of the
bargaining-power eect. To sum up, we can conclude that party i

's continuation value is greater
than party i

's.
In the following argument, we explain the intuition of the proposition in detail. Here, we focus
on the case that Æ 2 
i

;i;i

(=; >) and explain the intuition in the other cases in Appendix E. For
the following arguments, we denote the probability that party i obtains positive rents when she is
not the proposer, the rents which party i obtains when she is not the proposer and is distributed
positive rents to, and the rents which party i distributes to herself when she is the proposer, by
r
h
, x
h
, and y
h
, respectively, in equilibrium for h 2 N . r
h
, x
h
, and y
h
reect the shut-out eect,
the recipient's-bargaining-power eect, and the proposer's-bargainig-power eect, respectively.
On the expressions (7), (11) and (15) We consider the expressions (7), (11) and (15).
Consider the situation that Æ satises Æ 2 
i

;i;i

(=; >). The relationship between (r
i

; x
i

; y
i

)
and (r
i

; x
i

; y
i

) is summarized by Table 1, where  is an arbitrary honestly voting MPE in a(Æ).
i

i

r

1
2
n
3(Æ
i
 Æ
i

)
Æ
i

Æ
i
+
1
2
o
< 1
x

Æ
i

V
Æ
i

() > Æ
i

V
Æ
i

()
y

1  Æ
i

V
Æ
i

() > 1  Æ
i

V
Æ
i

()
Table 1: r

, x

and y

in case Æ 2 
i

;i;i

(=; >)
This table is explained as follows.
First, consider r
i

and r
i

. According to the expression (4), when Æ 2 
i

;i;i

(=; >), Æ
i

is much
smaller than Æ
i

and Æ
i
. So, when the proposer is party i

or i, the proposer distributes positive
rents to party i

with probability 1 because party i

's approval is less costly for the proposer than
another non-proposer party. On the other hand, party i

is distributed no rent to with probability
1 when the proposer is party i. When the proposer is party i

, party i

's approval is as costly for
party i

as party i's since Æ
i

and Æ
i

are similar, party i

randomizes the choice of which party to
distribute positive rents to. According to the expression (29), the probability that party i

obtains
positive rent is equal to
3(Æ
i
 Æ
i
 )
Æ
i
Æ
i
+
1
2
. Thus, we obtain r
i

< r
i

. So, in terms of the shut-out
eect, party i

tends to obtain more rents than party i

.
Next, consider x
i

and x
i

. Since Æ
i

is much greater than Æ
i

, party i

has higher threshold to
vote for or against the proposal than party i

. So, x
i

is greater than x
i

, that is, in terms of the
recipient's-bargaining-power eect, party i

tends to obtain more rents than party i

.
Finally, consider y
i

and y
i

. On the one hand, party i

wants to win party i

's approval when
she is the proposer, because Æ
i

is much smaller than Æ
i
and so party i

's approval is less costly
than party i's. On the other hand, perty i

's approval and party i's are indierent for party i

as the proposer, because Æ
i

and Æ
i
are similar. Since party i

's approver i

is much less patient
than party i

's approver i

or i, party i

can obtain more rents as the proposer than party i

, i.e.,
11
yi

> y
i

. So, in terms of the proposer's-bargaining-power eect, party i

tends to obtain more
rents than party i

.
These three eects aect the continuation values of parties i

and i

in dierent directions.
So, we cannot determine which party's continuation value is greater only from the table. Then,
consider the case that Æ
i

is extremely small. In the case, party i

cannot obtain many rents
when she is not the proposer, and party i

need not distribute many rents to i

when she is the
proposer. So, party i

's advantage in terms of the bargaining-power eect is very signicant. Thus,
it is likely that party i

's advantage in terms of the bargaining-power eect dominates party i

's
advantage in terms of the shut-out eect. Hence, if Æ
i

is extremely small, party i

's continuation
value is greater than party i

's, and otherwise, party i

's continuation value is smaller than party
i

's. The proposition states that the critical value whether Æ
i

is extremely small or not is equal
to
1
2

1 + Æ
i

 
Æ
i

Æ
i

.
4.4 Comparison between the majority rule and the unanimity rule
Proposition 2 states that more patient party's continuation value is smaller than less patient party's
under some discount factor proles. This seemingly paradoxical result comes from the majority
rule. To see this, we compare the majority rule with the unanimity rule.
Consider the game which has the same structure as a((Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
)) except for the voting rule.
In this game, a proposal passes if and only if all parties vote for the proposal. We denote party
h's 2 N equilibrium continuation value in the game by V
U
h
. For any discount factor prole, V
U
h
is
calculated as
V
U
h
=
(1  Æ
h+1
)(1  Æ
h+2
)
3  2(Æ
1
+ Æ
2
+ Æ
3
) + Æ
1
Æ
2
+ Æ
2
Æ
3
+ Æ
3
Æ
1
: (21)
Let fi

; i

; ig = N . Suppose that party i

is more patient than party i

, i.e., Æ
i

> Æ
i

. Then, we
have
V
U
i

  V
U
i

=
(Æ
i

  Æ
i

)(1  Æ
i
)
3  2(Æ
1
+ Æ
2
+ Æ
3
) + Æ
1
Æ
2
+ Æ
2
Æ
3
+ Æ
3
Æ
1
> 0
since Æ
i

> Æ
i

and the denominator is positive:
3  2(Æ
1
+ Æ
2
+ Æ
3
) + Æ
1
Æ
2
+ Æ
2
Æ
3
+ Æ
3
Æ
1
=  (2  Æ
2
  Æ
3
)Æ
1
+ 3  2(Æ
2
+ Æ
3
) + Æ
2
Æ
3
>  (2  Æ
2
  Æ
3
) + 3  2(Æ
2
+ Æ
3
) + Æ
2
Æ
3
= (1  Æ
2
)(1  Æ
3
) > 0:
That is, under the unanimity rule, more patient party's continuation value is greater than less
patient party's for any discount factor prole.
The reason for this is explained as follows. Under the unanimity rule, a proposal does not
pass without every party voting for it. Thus, a proposer has no choice to shut out a party, i.e.,
cannot help distributing enough positive rents to every non-proposer party. So, the shut-out eect,
which is advantageous to less patient party, has no eect under the unanimity rule, and only the
bargaining-power eect, which is advantageous to more patient party, remains. Therefore, more
patient party obtains greater value.
From the argument above, we can conclude as follows: the majority rule is featured by the
shut-out eect, which is advantageous to less patient party, thus less patient party obtains greater
continuation value under some discount factor proles.
5 Parties' patience and continuation value (II)
In this section, we investigate whether or not a party obtains a larger equilibrium payo as she
gets more patient.
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5.1 The result
The result is summarized by Proposition 3. This proposition is one of the two main results in this
paper.
Proposition 3 Take any Æ  (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 (0; 1)
3
. Take any honestly voting MPE  in a(Æ).
Then, for any h 2 N ,
(i) if and only if
Æ 2
0
@
[
R;l;m

l;m;h
(R;>)
1
A
[
0
@
[
l;m

l;h;m
(>;>)
1
A
;
then
@V
Æ
h
()
@Æ
h
> 0;
(ii) if and only if
Æ 2
[
R;l;m

h;l;m
(>;R);
then
@V
Æ
h
()
@Æ
h
= 0;
(iii) if and only if
Æ 2
[
(R;R
0
)6=(>;>);l;m

l;h;m
(R;R
0
);
then
@V
Æ
h
()
@Æ
h
< 0:
Proof. By Lemmata from 13 to 16 in Appendix F and Lemma 8. Q.E.D.
Thus, a party obtains a larger equilibrium payo as she gets more patient in case (i), while a party
obtains a smaller equilibrium payo as she gets more patient in case (iii). In the next subsection,
we shall oer an explanation why this seemingly counter-intuitive result is obtained.
5.2 The intuition of Proposition 3
The intuition of Proposition 3 can be also explained by the shut-out eect and the bargaining-power
eect.
First of all, consider the case that party h's discount factor is far from both the other parties',
i.e., the cases (i) and (ii) of the proposition. In these cases, since party h's discount factor is far
from both the other parties', party h is not distributed positive rents to in a probability sense, that
is, every proposer distributes positive rents to party h with certainty or with probability 0. This
is why innitesimal change of Æ
h
does not aect the shut-out eect. On the other hand, naturally,
the greater party h's discount factor Æ
h
gets, the stronger party h's bargaining power becomes.
So, innitesimal change of Æ
h
aects the bargaining-power eect
9
in favor of party h. To sum up,
innitesimal change of Æ
h
is advantageous to party h.
However, in case (ii) of the proposition, party h's discount factor is much greater than the other
two parties', so her approval is more costly for a proposer than the other non-proposer party, thus
every proposer does not distribute positive rents to party h, Therefore the party h's bargaining
power has no eect. Hence, in case (ii) of the proposition, innitesimal change of Æ
h
does not aect
party h's continuation value.
9
More precisely, innitesimal change of Æ
h
aects the recipient's-bargaining-power eect. It does not directly aect
the proposer's-bargaining-power eect.
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In case (iii) of the proposition, change of Æ
h
has a seemingly paradoxical eect on party h's
continuation value. The case of (iii) is the situation that there exists a party which as patient
as party h. Label such party h
0
and the othe party h
00
for the convinience sake. When party h
00
is the proposer, she distributes positive rents to party h with some probability r and to party h
0
with probability 1  r, because party h's approval is as costly as party h
0
's. If party h marginally
gets more patient, the proposer h
00
comes to hate party h and so decreases r. Hence, the shut-out
eect gets disadvantageous to party h as she becomes more patient. On the other hand, party
h's bargaining power is stronger as she is more patient. However, party h sharply competes with
party h
0
for political rents which the proposer h
00
distributes because party h is as patient as party
h
0
. So, party h cannot claim very many rents even if party h's becomes more patient. This is why
it is to a small extent that the bargaining-power eect becomes more advantageous to party h as
she is more patient. Thus, the shut-out eect dominates the bargaining-power eect. Hence, the
more patient party h becomes, the smaller her continuation value gets.
In this section, it is also meaningful to compare the majority rule with the unanimity rule.
Party h's equilibrium continuation value under the unanimity rule is given by the expression (21).
From the expression, we obtain
@V
U
h
@Æ
h
=
(1  Æ
h+1
)(1  Æ
h+2
)(2  Æ
h+1
  Æ
h+2
)
f3  2(Æ
1
+ Æ
2
+ Æ
3
) + Æ
1
Æ
2
+ Æ
2
Æ
3
+ Æ
3
Æ
1
g
2
> 0:
As explained in the previous section, the shut-out eect does not aect the continuation values
under the unanimity rule. Hence, increase of Æ
h
implies increase of party h's continuation value.
From this consideration, we can conclude that the seemingly paradoxical phenomenon in case (iii)
of the proposition comes from the characteristic of the majority rule, i.e., the shut-out eect.
6 Numerical examples
The following two examples help us understand Propositions 2 and 3. Let Æ
i
denote party i's
discount factor for i 2 N in this section.
Example 1 We consider the case that Æ
2
= Æ
3
=
1
2
. Then, we have

Æ
1
;
1
2
;
1
2

2
8
>
<
>
:

2;3;1
(=; >) i Æ
1
<
2
5

1;2;3
(=;=) i
2
5
 Æ
1

2
3

1;2;3
(>;=) i Æ
1
>
2
3
;
V
Æ
1
() =
8
>
<
>
:
3
11 8Æ
1
i Æ
1
<
2
5
1
1+4Æ
1
i
2
5
 Æ
1

2
3
3
11
i Æ
1
>
2
3
;
and
V
Æ
h
() =
8
>
<
>
:
4(1 Æ
1
)
11 8Æ
1
i Æ
1
<
2
5
2Æ
1
1+4Æ
1
i
2
5
 Æ
1

2
3
4
11
i Æ
1
>
2
3
for h = 2; 3. Figure 2 describes Æ
1
-V
Æ
i
() relationship.
Example 2 Now we consider the case that Æ
2
=
1
3
and Æ
3
=
2
3
. Then, we have

Æ
1
;
1
3
;
2
3

2
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
:

3;2;1
(>;>) i Æ
1
<
3
10

3;2;1
(>;=) i
3
10
 Æ
1

3
8

3;1;2
(>;>) i
3
8
< Æ
1
<
6
11

3;1;2
(=; >) i
6
11
 Æ
1

6
7

1;3;2
(>;>) i Æ
1
>
6
7
;
14
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Figure 2: Æ
1
-V
Æ
i
() relationship in case Æ
2
= Æ
3
=
1
2
V
Æ
1
() =
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
:
7
24 17Æ
1
i Æ
1
<
3
10
2
3+8Æ
1
i
3
10
 Æ
1

3
8
6
21 8Æ
1
i
3
8
< Æ
1
<
6
11
8
14+15Æ
1
i
6
11
 Æ
1

6
7
14
47
i Æ
1
>
6
7
;
V
Æ
2
() =
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
9(1 Æ
1
)
24 17Æ
1
i Æ
1
<
3
10
6Æ
1
3+8Æ
1
i
3
10
 Æ
1

3
8
3(3 2Æ
1
)
21 8Æ
1
i
3
8
< Æ
1
<
6
11
3(2+Æ
1
)
14+15Æ
1
i
6
11
 Æ
1

6
7
15
47
i Æ
1
>
6
7
;
and
V
Æ
3
() =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
8(1 Æ
1
)
24 17Æ
1
i Æ
1
<
3
10
1+2Æ
1
3+8Æ
1
i
3
10
 Æ
1

3
8
2(3 Æ
1
)
21 8Æ
1
i
3
8
< Æ
1
<
6
11
12Æ
1
14+15Æ
1
i
6
11
 Æ
1

6
7
18
47
i Æ
1
>
6
7
:
Figure 3 describes Æ
1
-V
Æ
i
() relationship.
7 Conclusion
We observed a seemingly paradoxical phenomenon that, in the legislative bargaining, more patient
party's continuation value is smaller than less patient party's under some discount factor proles
(Section 4). Moreover, it was shown that under some discount factor proles, when a party
marginally becomes more patient, her continuation value decreases (Section 5). These seemingly
paradoxical phenomena do not appear in ordinary bargaining models.
The cause of these phenomena occuring is explained as follows. In the legislative bargaining,
the decision is made according to the majority rule. A proposer can make her proposal pass by
winning only one non-proposer party's approval. Patient party's approval is costly for a proposer.
Thus, a proposer wants the less patient non-proposer party's approval. So, the more patient non-
proposer party is distributed no rent to. The more patient party is, so to speak, shut out by
a proposer. This eect of patience is unique to the legislative bargaining, more exactly, to the
majority rule. This paper summarized above.
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Figure 3: Æ
1
-V
Æ
i
() relationship in case Æ
2
=
1
3
and Æ
3
=
2
3
By the way, the model can be extended in some ways.
Endogenizing the discount factors First of all, we consider endogenizing the discount
factors. Since common discount factor is not assumed in a(Æ), we can endogenize discount factors
as follows. Add to the game above the 0th stage where each party simultaneously decides her own
discount factor. Formally, we construct the game as follows. Take  2 (0; 1). In the 0th stage,
party i 2 N decides her own discount factor from 
i
 fkg
n

k=1
with n

  

 
1 


. Note that
n

 1 for any  2 (0; 1). After Æ 2
Q
i2N

i
is selected, the a(Æ) is played. Let
^
a() denote this
extended game.
For any  2 (0; 1), the game
^
a() has an equilibrium in which every party selects . The reason
is as follows. For  2 (0; 1) such that n

= 1, the claim above is trivially obvious. We consider the
case that n

 2. Without loss of generality, it is suÆcient to party 1 has no incentive to deviate
from . Assume that party 1 deviates from  to k with k 2 f2; : : : ; n

g. (k; ; ) 2 
1;2;3
(>;=)
because
 1  3

1

 
1


 1
and
1

+
1

 
2
k

1

+
1

 
2
2
=
1

> 1:
Thus, from the expression (30), party 1 obtains the expected payo of
2  
6  
(22)
under (k; ; ). On the other hand, since
 1 
1

+
1

 
2

 1;
we have (; ; ) 2 
1;2;3
(=;=). Thus, from the expression (1), party 1 obtains the expected payo
of
1
3
(23)
under (; ; ). Comparing the expression (22) with the expression (23), we obtain
1
3
 
2  
6  
=
2
3(6  )
> 0:
So, party 1 has no incentive to deviate from  in
^
a() with n

 2. To sum up, for any  2 (0; 1),
the game
^
a() has an equilibrium in which every party selects . That is, in this equilibrium, every
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party selects as small discount factor as possible. Particularly, every party's equilibrium discount
factor converges to 0 as the grid of selectable discount factor proles gets as ne as possible.
Interpretation of this extended model and the extreme and eccentric result is to be considered
in the future.
Generalizing the number of parties We can extend the model above as there are many
parties. Let n be an odd integer and n  1. Let N  f1; : : : ; ng instead of N  f1; 2; 3g. Assume
that every coalition of
n+1
2
parties has the majority of the seats in the legislature and that every
coalition of
n 1
2
parties does not have the majority of the seats in the legislature.
Let Æ
i
and V
i
denote party i's 2 N discount factor and equilibrium continuation value, respec-
tively. Consider equilibria in which Æ
i
V
i
= Æ
j
V
j
for all i; j 2 N . Let
C
i


C 2 2
Nnfig
j card C =
n  1
2

for i 2 N . For i 2 N and C 2 C
i
, dene x
i
(C)  (x
j
)
n
j=1
with
x
j

8
>
<
>
:
Æ
j
V
j
if j 2 C
0 if j 2 N n fig n C
1 
P
h2C
Æ
h
V
h
if j = i
for j 2 N . In equilibrium, every party i 2 N seems to propose a policy x
i
(C) with probability
r
i
(C) 2 [0; 1] for all C 2 C
i
and a policy x 2 X nfx
i
(C) j C 2 C
i
g with probability 0. V
i
and r
i
(C)
must satisfy
V
i
=
P
C2C
i
r
i
(C)

1 
P
j2C
Æ
j
V
j

+
P
j 6=i
P
C2C
j
^C3i
r
j
(C)Æ
i
V
i
n
and
X
C2C
i
r
i
(C) = 1
for all i 2 N , and
Æ
1
V
1
=    = Æ
n
V
n
:
Let R denote the set of (r
i
(C))
i2N;C2C
i
satisfying the equations above. Note that
dimR =
X
i2N
card C
i
=
n!
 
n 1
2
!

2
 L:
There are equilibria such that Æ
i
V
i
= Æ
j
V
j
for all i; j 2 N if and only if there are discount factor
proles such that R \ [0; 1]
L
6= ;.
In the n-party case, it is diÆcult to solve the model. However, n-party model seems to obtain
the result similar to 3-party model.
Asymmetric information It is natural that a party does not know how patient the other
parties are. So, treating a party's discount factor as her private information is more realistic
approach.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The necessity is obvious. Thus, the proof is complete if we verify the suÆciency. Fix an
arbitrary   (
i
)
i2N
2  such that for any h
0
2 H
0
,  forms a subgame perfect equilibrium in
a
S
(h
0
; ; Æ). Take any i 2 N and any h 2 H such that P (h) = i _ P (h) = (1; 2; 3). And, take any

0
i
2 
i
such that 
0
i
is equivalent to 
i
except that 
0
i
(h) 6= 
i
(h). For the rst time, consider the
case that P (h) = i. For h, we dene h
0
as (h
0
; i) = h.  forms a subgame perfect equilibrium in
a
S
(h
0
; ; Æ). Thus, we can symbolically write
Z
x2[0;1]
3
 
Z
v2fa;rg
3
u
S
i
(h
0
; ; Æ)(i;x; v)d(h
0
; i;x)(fvg)
!
d
i
(h
0
; i)(fxg)

Z
x2[0;1]
3
 
Z
v2fa;rg
3
u
S
i
(h
0
; ; Æ)(i;x; v)d(h
0
; i;x)(fvg)
!
d
0
i
(h
0
; i)(fxg):
Using
^
V , we can rewrite this expression as
^
V
i
((h
0
; i); ; Æ) 
^
V
i
((h
0
; i); (
0
i
; 
 i
); Æ): (24)
Secondly, consider the case that P (h) = (1; 2; 3). Let (h
0
; p;x) = h.  forms a subgame perfect
equilibrium in a
S
(h
0
; ; Æ). Thus, we can symbolically write
Z
v2fa;rg
3
u
S
i
(h
0
; ; Æ)(p;x; v)d(h
0
; p;x)(fvg)

Z
v
i
2fa;rg
 
Z
v
 i
2fa;rg
2
u
S
i
(h
0
; ; Æ)(p;x; v)d
 i
(h
0
; p;x)(fv
 i
g)
!
d
0
i
(h
0
; p;x)(fv
i
g):
Using
^
V , we can rewrite this expression as
^
V
i
((h
0
; p;x); ; Æ) 
^
V
i
((h
0
; p;x); (
0
i
; 
 i
); Æ) (25)
Hence, from the inequalites (24) and (25), the following inequality holds in both cases:
^
V
i
(h; ; Æ) 
^
V
i
(h; (
0
i
; 
 i
); Æ):
By this inequality and One Deviation Principle, it is veried that  is a subgame perfect equilib-
rium. Q.E.D.
B A necessary and suÆcient condition for E
Æ
i;j;k
(R;R
0
) 6= ; in
the other cases
B.1 A necessary and suÆcient condition for E
Æ
i;j;k
(=; >) 6= ;
We want to seek a necessary and suÆcient condition for E
Æ
i;j;k
(=; >) 6= ;.
Suppose that E
Æ
i;j;k
(=; >) 6= ;. Take any strategy prole  2 E
Æ
i;j;k
(=; >). Let (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
)  Æ.
Since Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() = Æ
j
V
Æ
j
() > Æ
k
V
Æ
k
(), in , (i) every party h 2 fi; j; kg votes for a policy such that
x
g
h
 Æ
h
V
Æ
h
() and against a policy such that x
g
h
< Æ
h
V
Æ
h
() for g 2 fi; j; kg, (ii) party i proposes
a policy such that
 
x
i
i
; x
i
j
; x
i
k

=
 
1  Æ
k
V
Æ
k
(); 0; Æ
k
V
Æ
k
()

;
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(iii) party j proposes a policy such that

x
j
i
; x
j
j
; x
j
k

=
 
0; 1  Æ
k
V
Æ
k
(); Æ
k
V
Æ
k
()

;
and (vi) party k proposes a policy such that
 
x
k
i
; x
k
j
; x
k
k

=
 
Æ
i
V
Æ
i
(); 0; 1  Æ
i
V
Æ
i
()

with probability r and a policy such that
 
x
k
i
; x
k
j
; x
k
k

=
 
0; Æ
j
V
Æ
j
(); 1  Æ
j
V
Æ
j
()

with probability 1  r. Hence, each party's continuation value is as follows:
V
Æ
i
() =
1
3
 
1  Æ
k
V
Æ
k
()

+
1
3
 0 +
1
3
rÆ
i
V
Æ
i
();
V
Æ
j
() =
1
3
 
1  Æ
k
V
Æ
k
()

+
1
3
(1  r) Æ
j
V
Æ
j
() +
1
3
 0;
and
V
Æ
k
() =
1
3

rÆ
i
V
Æ
i
() + (1  r) Æ
j
V
Æ
j
()
	
+
1
3
Æ
k
V
Æ
k
() +
1
3
Æ
k
V
Æ
k
():
Moreover, utilizing Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() = Æ
j
V
Æ
j
(), we obtain
V
Æ
i
() =
2Æ
j
(1  Æ
k
)
(3  2Æ
k
) (Æ
i
+ Æ
j
)  Æ
i
Æ
j
; (26)
V
Æ
j
() =
2Æ
i
(1  Æ
k
)
(3  2Æ
k
) (Æ
i
+ Æ
j
)  Æ
i
Æ
j
; (27)
V
Æ
k
() =
Æ
i
+ Æ
j
  Æ
i
Æ
j
(3  2Æ
k
) (Æ
i
+ Æ
j
)  Æ
i
Æ
j
; (28)
and
r =
3 (Æ
j
  Æ
i
)
2Æ
i
Æ
j
+
1
2
: (29)
These must satisfy Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() > Æ
k
V
Æ
k
() and 0  r  1. Hence,
Æ
i
2Æ
j
(1  Æ
k
)
(3  2Æ
k
) (Æ
i
+ Æ
j
)  Æ
i
Æ
j
> Æ
k
Æ
i
+ Æ
j
  Æ
i
Æ
j
(3  2Æ
k
) (Æ
i
+ Æ
j
)  Æ
i
Æ
j
and
0 
3 (Æ
j
  Æ
i
)
2Æ
i
Æ
j
+
1
2
 1
must hold. Therefore,
 1  3

1
Æ
i
 
1
Æ
j

 1
and
1
Æ
i
+
1
Æ
j
 
2
Æ
k
<  1
must be satised. These two expressions are a necessary and suÆcient condition for E
Æ
i;j;k
(=; >
) 6= ;.
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B.2 A necessary and suÆcient condition for E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;=) 6= ;
We want to seek a necessary and suÆcient condition for E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;=) 6= ;.
Suppose that E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;=) 6= ;. Take any strategy prole  2 E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;=). Let (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
)  Æ.
Since Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() > Æ
j
V
Æ
j
() = Æ
k
V
Æ
k
(), in , (i) every party h 2 fi; j; kg votes for a policy such that
x
g
h
 Æ
h
V
Æ
h
() and against a policy such that x
g
h
< Æ
h
V
Æ
h
() for g 2 fi; j; kg, (ii) party i proposes
a policy such that
 
x
i
i
; x
i
j
; x
i
k

=
 
1  Æ
j
V
Æ
j
(); Æ
j
V
Æ
j
(); 0

with probability r and a policy such that
 
x
i
i
; x
i
j
; x
i
k

=
 
1  Æ
k
V
Æ
k
(); 0; Æ
k
V
Æ
k
()

with probability 1  r, (iii) party j proposes a policy such that

x
j
i
; x
j
j
; x
j
k

=
 
0; 1  Æ
k
V
Æ
k
(); Æ
k
V
Æ
k
()

;
and (vi) party k proposes a policy such that
 
x
k
i
; x
k
j
; x
k
k

=
 
0; Æ
j
V
Æ
j
(); 1  Æ
j
V
Æ
j
()

:
Hence, each party's continuation value is as follows:
V
Æ
i
() =
1
3

r
 
1  Æ
j
V
Æ
j
()

+ (1  r)
 
1  Æ
k
V
Æ
k
()
	
+
1
3
 0 +
1
3
 0;
V
Æ
j
() =
1
3
 
1  Æ
k
V
Æ
k
()

+
1
3
Æ
j
V
Æ
j
() +
1
3
rÆ
j
V
Æ
j
();
and
V
Æ
k
() =
1
3
 
1  Æ
j
V
Æ
j
()

+
1
3
(1  r) Æ
k
V
Æ
k
() +
1
3
Æ
k
V
Æ
k
():
Moreover, utilizing Æ
j
V
Æ
j
() = Æ
k
V
Æ
k
(), we obtain
V
Æ
i
() =
Æ
j
+ Æ
k
  Æ
j
Æ
k
3 (Æ
j
+ Æ
k
)  Æ
j
Æ
k
; (30)
V
Æ
j
() =
2Æ
k
3 (Æ
j
+ Æ
k
)  Æ
j
Æ
k
; (31)
V
Æ
k
() =
2Æ
j
3 (Æ
j
+ Æ
k
)  Æ
j
Æ
k
; (32)
and
r =
3 (Æ
k
  Æ
j
)
2Æ
j
Æ
k
+
1
2
: (33)
These must satisfy Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() > Æ
j
V
Æ
j
() and 0  r  1. Hence,
Æ
i
Æ
j
+ Æ
k
  Æ
j
Æ
k
3 (Æ
j
+ Æ
k
)  Æ
j
Æ
k
> Æ
j
2Æ
k
3 (Æ
j
+ Æ
k
)  Æ
j
Æ
k
and
0 
3 (Æ
k
  Æ
j
)
2Æ
j
Æ
k
+
1
2
 1
must hold. Therefore,
 1  3

1
Æ
j
 
1
Æ
k

 1
and
1
Æ
j
+
1
Æ
k
 
2
Æ
i
> 1
must be satised. These two expressions are a necessary and suÆcient condition for E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;=
) 6= ;.
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B.3 A necessary and suÆcient condition for E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;>) 6= ;
We want to seek a necessary and suÆcient condition for E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;>) 6= ;.
Suppose that E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;>) 6= ;. Take any strategy prole  2 E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;>). Let (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
)  Æ.
Since Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() > Æ
j
V
Æ
j
() > Æ
k
V
Æ
k
(), in , (i) every party h 2 fi; j; kg votes for a policy such that
x
g
h
 Æ
h
V
Æ
h
() and against a policy such that x
g
h
< Æ
h
V
Æ
h
() for g 2 fi; j; kg, (ii) party i proposes
a policy such that
 
x
i
i
; x
i
j
; x
i
k

=
 
1  Æ
k
V
Æ
k
(); 0; Æ
k
V
Æ
k
()

;
(iii) party j proposes a policy such that

x
j
i
; x
j
j
; x
j
k

=
 
0; 1  Æ
k
V
Æ
k
(); Æ
k
V
Æ
k
()

;
and (vi) party k proposes a policy such that
 
x
k
i
; x
k
j
; x
k
k

=
 
0; Æ
j
V
Æ
j
(); 1  Æ
j
V
Æ
j
()

:
Hence, each party's continuation value is as follows:
V
Æ
i
() =
1
3
 
1  Æ
k
V
Æ
k
()

+
1
3
 0 +
1
3
 0;
V
Æ
j
() =
1
3
 
1  Æ
k
V
Æ
k
()

+
1
3
Æ
j
V
Æ
j
() +
1
3
 0;
and
V
Æ
k
() =
1
3
 
1  Æ
j
V
Æ
j
()

+
1
3
Æ
k
V
Æ
k
() +
1
3
Æ
k
V
Æ
k
():
Moreover, parametering the values, we obtain
V
Æ
i
() =
(3  Æ
j
) (1  Æ
k
)
9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
; (34)
V
Æ
j
() =
3 (1  Æ
k
)
9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
; (35)
and
V
Æ
k
() =
3  2Æ
j
9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
: (36)
These must satisfy Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() > Æ
j
V
Æ
j
() > Æ
k
V
Æ
k
(). Hence,
Æ
i
(3  Æ
j
) (1  Æ
k
)
9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
> Æ
j
3 (1  Æ
k
)
9  3Æ
i
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
> Æ
k
3  2Æ
j
9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
must hold. Therefore,
3

1
Æ
i
 
1
Æ
j

<  1
and
3

1
Æ
j
 
1
Æ
k

<  1
must be satised. These two expressions are a necessary and suÆcient condition for E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;>
) 6= ;.
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C Proof of Lemma 8
We prove Lemma 8 in two ways. One of them (Proof 1) is a abstract way and another (Proof 2)
is in accordance with the arguments in Section 3.3. In Proof 1, we use Kakutani's Fixed Point
Theorem not in ordinary way.
Proof 1. Take an arbitrary Æ  (Æ
j
)
j2N
2 (0; 1)
3
. Dene F
Æ
: [0; 1]
9
 [0; 1]
9
as follows: for
z  (r
j
; x
j
j+1
; x
j
j+2
)
3
j=1
2 [0; 1]
9
,
F
Æ
(z) =
3
Y
j=1
 
R
Æ
j
(z) X
Æ
j
(z)

;
where
R
Æ
i
(z) =
8
>
<
>
:
f1g if v
Æ
i+1
(z) < v
Æ
i+2
(z)
[0; 1] if v
Æ
i+1
(z) = v
Æ
i+2
(z)
f0g if v
Æ
i+1
(z) > v
Æ
i+2
(z)
and
X
Æ
i
(z) =
 
v
Æ
i+1
(z); v
Æ
i+2
(z)
	
;
for i 2 N with
v
Æ
i
(z) = Æ
i

1
3

1  r
i
Æ
i+1
x
i
i+1
 
 
1  r
i

Æ
i+2
x
i
i+2
	
+
 
1  r
i+1

Æ
i
x
i+1
i
+ r
i+2
Æ
i
x
i+2
i

:
Obviously, [0; 1]
9
is compact and convex, and F
Æ
is upper-semicontinuous and has nonempty and
convex values. Hence, Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem yields 9z

2 [0; 1]
9
: z

2 F
Æ
(z

). Pick
z

2 [0; 1]
9
such that z

2 F
Æ
(z

). Let (r
j
; x
j
j+1
; x
j
j+2
)
3
j=1
 z

. Consider a strategy prole s
such that every party i 2 N votes for a proposal (x
j
)
j2N
if and only if x
i
 v
Æ
i
(z

) and proposes
(1   x
i
i+1
; x
i
i+1
; 0) with probability r
i
and (1   x
i
i+2
; 0; x
i
i+2
) with probability 1   r
i
. Taking
z

2 F
Æ
(z

) into account, we can show that s is a honestly voting MPE. Hence, it is shown that
a(Æ) has honestly voting MPE for all Æ 2 (0; 1). Therefore, 8Æ 2 (0; 1)
3
9 2 D : Æ 2 . Q.E.D.
Proof 2. The proof is complete by showing (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2
S
2D
 for any (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 (0; 1)
3
.
Invoking the symmetry, it is suÆcient to verify (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2
S
2D
 for any (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 (0; 1)
3
such that Æ
1
 Æ
2
 Æ
3
. Take any (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 (0; 1)
3
such that Æ
1
 Æ
2
 Æ
3
. We consider
the following four cases: (I) 3

1
Æ
1
 
1
Æ
2

  1 ^ 3

1
Æ
2
 
1
Æ
3

  1, (II) 3

1
Æ
1
 
1
Æ
2

  1 ^
3

1
Æ
2
 
1
Æ
3

<  1, (III) 3

1
Æ
1
 
1
Æ
2

<  1 ^ 3

1
Æ
2
 
1
Æ
3

  1, and (IV) 3

1
Æ
1
 
1
Æ
2

<  1 ^
3

1
Æ
2
 
1
Æ
3

<  1.
(I) 3

1
Æ
1
 
1
Æ
2

  1^ 3

1
Æ
2
 
1
Æ
3

  1 (Ineq.I). We consider the three cases: (I-i)
1
Æ
2
+
1
Æ
3
 
2
Æ
1
> 1, (I-ii)
1
Æ
1
+
1
Æ
2
 
2
Æ
3
<  1, and (I-iii)
1
Æ
2
+
1
Æ
3
 
2
Æ
1
 1 ^
1
Æ
1
+
1
Æ
2
 
2
Æ
3
  1.
(I-i)
1
Æ
2
+
1
Æ
3
 
2
Æ
1
> 1 (Ineq.I-i). Æ
2
 Æ
3
and the second inequality of the expression (Ineq.I)
yields  1  3

1
Æ
2
 
1
Æ
3

 0. This inequality and the expression (Ineq.I-i) imply (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2

1;2;3
(>;=).
(I-ii)
1
Æ
1
+
1
Æ
2
 
2
Æ
3
<  1 (Ineq.I-ii). Æ
1
 Æ
2
and the rst inequality of the expression (Ineq.I)
yields  1  3

1
Æ
1
 
1
Æ
2

 0. This inequality and (Ineq.I-ii) imply (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
1;2;3
(=; >).
(I-iii)
1
Æ
2
+
1
Æ
3
 
2
Æ
1
 1 ^
1
Æ
1
+
1
Æ
2
 
2
Æ
3
  1 (Ineq.I-iii). Æ
1
 Æ
2
 Æ
3
and the expression
(Ineq.I-iii) yield
0 
1
Æ
2
+
1
Æ
3
 
2
Æ
1
 1 (37)
and
 1 
1
Æ
1
+
1
Æ
2
 
2
Æ
3
 0: (38)
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Furthermore, these inequalities imply
 1 
1
Æ
3
+
1
Æ
1
 
2
Æ
2
 1: (39)
From inequalities (37) to (39), we obtain (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
1;2;3
(=;=).
(II) 3

1
Æ
1
 
1
Æ
2

  1^3

1
Æ
2
 
1
Æ
3

<  1 (Ineq.II). We consider the two cases: (II-i)
1
Æ
1
+
1
Æ
2
 
2
Æ
3
  1 and (II-ii)
1
Æ
1
+
1
Æ
2
 
2
Æ
3
<  1.
(II-i)
1
Æ
1
+
1
Æ
2
 
2
Æ
3
  1 (Ineq.II-i). Æ
1
 Æ
2
 Æ
3
and the inequality (Ineq.II-i) yield
 1 
1
Æ
1
+
1
Æ
2
 
2
Æ
3
 0; (40)
This inequality and the rst inequality of the expression (Ineq.II) yield
1
Æ
2
+
1
Æ
3
 
2
Æ
1
 1:
Moreover, by Æ
1
 Æ
2
 Æ
3
,
0 
1
Æ
2
+
1
Æ
3
 
2
Æ
1
 1: (41)
Furthermore, the inequalities (40) and (41) yield
 1 
1
Æ
3
+
1
Æ
1
 
2
Æ
2
 1: (42)
Hence, from the inequalities (40) to (42), we obtain (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
1;2;3
(=;=).
(II-ii)
1
Æ
1
+
1
Æ
2
 
2
Æ
3
<  1 (Ineq.II-ii). Æ
1
 Æ
2
and the rst inequality of the expression
(II) yield 0  3

1
Æ
2
 
1
Æ
1

 1. From this inequality and the inequality (Ineq.II-ii), we obtain
(Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
1;2;3
(=; >).
(III) 3

1
Æ
1
 
1
Æ
2

<  1 ^ 3

1
Æ
2
 
1
Æ
3

  1 (Ineq.III). We consider the two cases: (III-i)
1
Æ
2
+
1
Æ
3
 
2
Æ
1
 1 and (III-ii)
1
Æ
2
+
1
Æ
3
 
2
Æ
1
> 1.
(III-i)
1
Æ
2
+
1
Æ
3
 
2
Æ
1
 1 (Ineq.III-i). Æ
1
 Æ
2
 Æ
3
and the inequality (Ineq.III-i) yield
0 
1
Æ
2
+
1
Æ
3
 
2
Æ
1
 1: (43)
This inequality and the second inequality of the expression (III) yield
1
Æ
1
+
1
Æ
2
 
2
Æ
3
  1. Moreover,
by Æ
1
 Æ
2
 Æ
3
,
 1 
1
Æ
1
+
1
Æ
2
 
2
Æ
3
 0: (44)
Furthermore, the inequalities (43) and (44) yield
 1 
1
Æ
3
+
1
Æ
1
 
2
Æ
2
 1: (45)
Hence, from the inequalities (43) to (45), we obtain (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
1;2;3
(=;=).
(III-ii)
1
Æ
2
+
1
Æ
3
 
2
Æ
1
> 1 (Ineq.III-ii). Æ
2
 Æ
3
and the second inequality of the expression
(III) yield 0  3

1
Æ
3
 
1
Æ
2

 1. From this inequality and the inequality (Ineq.III-ii), we obtain
(Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
1;2;3
(>;=).
(IV) 3

1
Æ
1
 
1
Æ
2

<  1 ^ 3

1
Æ
2
 
1
Æ
3

<  1 (Ineq.IV). Obviously, (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
1;2;3
(>;>).
Q.E.D.
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D Lemmata to prove Proposition 2
Lemma 9 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Take any Æ  (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
i;j;k
(=;=). Take any honestly
voting MPE  in a(Æ). Then,
8fl;mg  N : Æ
l
Q Æ
m
) V
Æ
l
() R V
Æ
m
():
Proof. From Proposition 2,  2 E
Æ
i;j;k
(=;=). Hence, the denition of E
Æ
i;j;k
(=;=) yields
Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() = Æ
j
V
Æ
j
() = Æ
k
V
Æ
k
():
Therefore, the proof is complete. Q.E.D.
Lemma 10 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Take any Æ  (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
i;j;k
(=; >). Take any
honestly voting MPE  in a(Æ). Then,
Æ
i
Q Æ
j
) V
Æ
i
() R V
Æ
j
(); (46)
and
Æ
k
Q
1
2

1 + Æ
l
 
Æ
l
Æ
m

) V
Æ
l
() R V
Æ
k
() (47)
for fl;mg = fi; jg.
Proof. On the expression (46). From Proposition 2,  2 E
Æ
i;j;k
(=; >). The denition of E
Æ
i;j;k
(=
; >) yields Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() = Æ
j
V
Æ
j
(): Therefore, the proof is complete for the expression (46).
On the expression (47). From Proposition 2,  2 E
Æ
i;j;k
(=; >). The denition of E
Æ
i;j;k
(=; >)
yields
V
Æ
i
() =
2Æ
j
(1  Æ
k
)
(3  2Æ
k
) (Æ
i
+ Æ
j
)  Æ
i
Æ
j
(48)
and
V
Æ
k
() =
Æ
i
+ Æ
j
  Æ
i
Æ
j
(3  2Æ
k
) (Æ
i
+ Æ
j
)  Æ
i
Æ
j
: (49)
So,
V
Æ
j
()   V
Æ
i
() =
 Æ
i
+ Æ
i
Æ
j
+ Æ
j
  2Æ
j
Æ
k
(3  2Æ
k
) (Æ
i
+ Æ
j
)  Æ
i
Æ
j
;
of which the denominator is obviously positive. Hence,
sgn(V
Æ
i
()  V
Æ
k
()) = sgn( Æ
i
+ Æ
i
Æ
j
+ Æ
j
  2Æ
j
Æ
k
) = sgn

1
2

1 + Æ
i
 
Æ
i
Æ
j

  Æ
k

:
Thus, we obtain
Æ
k
Q
1
2

1 + Æ
i
 
Æ
i
Æ
j

) V
Æ
i
() R V
Æ
k
(): (50)
Similarly,
Æ
k
Q
1
2

1 + Æ
j
 
Æ
j
Æ
i

) V
Æ
j
() R V
Æ
k
(): (51)
Therefore, the proof is complete for the expression (47). Q.E.D.
Lemma 11 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Take any Æ  (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
i;j;k
(>;=). Take any
honestly voting MPE  in a(Æ). Then,
8l 2 fj; kg : V
Æ
i
() < V
Æ
l
() (52)
and
Æ
j
Q Æ
k
) V
Æ
j
() R V
Æ
k
(): (53)
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Proof. On the expression (52). From Proposition 2,  2 E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;=). Hence, we obtain
V
Æ
i
() =
Æ
j
+ Æ
k
  Æ
j
Æ
k
3 (Æ
j
+ Æ
k
)  Æ
j
Æ
k
and
V
Æ
j
() =
2Æ
k
3 (Æ
j
+ Æ
k
)  Æ
j
Æ
k
:
So,
V
Æ
j
()  V
Æ
i
() =
Æ
k
  Æ
j
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
3 (Æ
j
+ Æ
k
)  Æ
j
Æ
k
: (54)
By the way, the denition of 
i;j;k
(>;=) yields
 1  3

1
Æ
j
 
1
Æ
k

 1;
which implies
Æ
k
  Æ
j
+ Æ
j
Æ
k

2
3
Æ
j
Æ
k
> 0:
And the denominator of the right hand side of expression (54) is obviously positive. Therefore,
V
Æ
j
() > V
Æ
i
():
Similarly,
V
Æ
k
() > V
Æ
i
():
Hence, the proof is complete for the expression (52).
On the expression (53). From Proposition 2,  2 E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;=). The denition of E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;=)
yields Æ
j
V
Æ
j
() = Æ
k
V
Æ
k
(): Therefore, the proof is complete for the expression (53). Q.E.D.
Lemma 12 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Take any Æ  (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
i;j;k
(>;>). Take any
honestly voting MPE  in a(Æ). Then,
V
Æ
i
() < V
Æ
j
(); (55)
Æ
k
Q
2
3
Æ
j
) V
Æ
j
() R V
Æ
k
() (56)
and
Æ
k
Q
Æ
j
3  Æ
j
) V
Æ
i
() R V
Æ
k
(): (57)
Proof. On the expression (55). From Proposition 2,  2 E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;>). The denition of E
Æ
i;j;k
(>
;>) yields
V
Æ
i
() =
(3  Æ
j
) (1  Æ
k
)
9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
;
and
V
Æ
j
() =
3 (1  Æ
k
)
9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
:
So,
V
Æ
j
()  V
Æ
i
() =
Æ
j
(1  Æ
k
)
9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
> 0:
On the expression (56). From Proposition 2,  2 E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;>). The denition of E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;>)
yields
V
Æ
j
() =
3 (1  Æ
k
)
9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
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and
V
Æ
k
() =
3  2Æ
j
9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
:
So,
V
Æ
j
()  V
Æ
k
() =
2Æ
j
  3Æ
k
9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
:
Hence,
sgn
 
V
Æ
j
()   V
Æ
k
()

= sgn(2Æ
j
  3Æ
k
):
Thus, we obtain
Æ
k
Q
2
3
Æ
j
) V
Æ
j
() R V
Æ
k
():
On the expression (57). From Proposition 2,  2 E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;>). The denition of E
Æ
i;j;k
(>;>)
yields
V
Æ
i
() =
(3  Æ
j
) (1  Æ
k
)
9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
and
V
Æ
k
() =
3  2Æ
j
9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
:
So,
V
Æ
i
()  V
Æ
k
() =
Æ
j
  Æ
k
(3  Æ
j
)
9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
:
Hence,
sgn
 
V
Æ
i
()   V
Æ
k
()

= sgn(Æ
j
  Æ
k
(3  Æ
j
)):
Thus, we obtain
Æ
k
Q
Æ
j
3  Æ
j
) V
Æ
i
() R V
Æ
k
():
Q.E.D.
E Intuition of Proposition 2: In detail
On the expressions (8), (12) and (16) For the expressions (8), (12) and (16), the intuition
is also explained by the similar logic as the expressions (7), (11) and (15).
Consider the situation that Æ satises Æ 2 
i

;i;i

(>;>). The relationship between (r
i

; x
i

; y
i

)
and (r
i

; x
i

; y
i

) is summarized by Table 2, where  is an arbitrary honestly voting MPE in a(Æ).
i

i

r

0 < 1
x

Æ
i

V
Æ
i

()
y

1  Æ
i

V
Æ
i

() > 1  Æ
i
V
Æ
i
()
Table 2: r

, x

and y

in case Æ 2 
i

;i;i

(>;>)
This table is explained as follows.
According to the expression (6), when Æ 2 
i

;i;i

(>;>), Æ
i

is much smaller than Æ
i
, and Æ
i
is much smaller than Æ
i

. So, when the proposer is party i

or i, the proposer distributes positive
rents of Æ
i

V
Æ
i

() to party i

with probability 1 because party i

's approval is less costly for the
proposer than another non-proposer party. On the other hand, party i

is distributed no rent to
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with probability 1 when the proposer is party i

or i. So, in terms of the shut-out eect and the
recipient's-bargaining-power eect, party i

tends to obtain more rents than party i

.
Next, consider the proposer's-bargaining-power eect. On the one hand, party i

wants to win
party i

's approval when she is the proposer, because Æ
i

is much smaller than Æ
i
and so party
i

's approval is less costly than party i's one. On the other hand, party i

wants to win party i's
approval when she is the proposer, because Æ
i
is much smaller than Æ
i

and so party i's approval
is less costly than party i

's one. Since party i

's approver i

is much less patient than party i

's
approver i, party i

can obtain more rents as the proposer than party i
Æ
, i.e., y
i

> y
i

. So, in
terms of the proposer's-bargaining-power eect, party i

tends to obtain more rents than party i

.
As mensioned above, the shut-out eect and the recipient's-bargaining-power eect, and the
proposer's-bargaining-power eect aect the continuation values of parties i

and i

in dierent
directions. So, we cannot determine which party's continuation value is greater only from the table.
Then, consider the case that Æ
i

is extremely small. In the case, party i

cannot obtain many rents
when she is not the proposer, and party i

need not distribute many rents to i

when she is the
proposer. So, party i

's advantage in terms of the shut-out eect and the recipient's-bargaining-
power eect is very small, and party i

's advantage in terms of the proposer's-bargaining-power
eect is very signicant. Thus, it is likely that party i

's advantage in terms of the proposer's
bargaining-power eect dominates party i

's advantage in terms of the other eects. Hence, if Æ
i

is extremely small, party i

's continuation value is greater than party i

's, and otherwise, party
i

's continuation value is smaller than party i

's. The proposition states that the critical value of
Æ
i

is equal to
Æ
i
3 Æ
i
.
On the expressions (9), (13) and (17) For the expressions (9), (13) and (17), the intuition
is also explained by the similar logic as the expressions (7), (11) and (15). The relationship between
(r
i

; x
i

; y
i

) and (r
i

; x
i

; y
i

) is summarized by Table 3, where  is an arbitrary honestly voting
MPE in a(Æ).
i

i

r

1
2
< 1
x

Æ
i

V
Æ
i

() > Æ
i

V
Æ
i

()
y

1  Æ
i

V
Æ
i

() > 1  Æ
i

V
Æ
i

()
Table 3: r

, x

and y

in case Æ 2 
i;i

;i

(>;>)
This table is explained as follows.
First, consider r
i

and r
i

. According to the expression (6), when Æ 2 
i;i

;i

(>;>), Æ
i

is
much smaller than Æ
i

, and Æ
i

is much smaller than Æ
i
. So, when the proposer is party i

or i, the
proposer distributes positive rents to party i

with probability 1 because party i

's approval is less
costly for the proposer than another non-proposer party. On the other hand, by the same logic,
party i

is distributed no rent to with probability 1 when the proposer is party i, and positive
rents with probability 1 when the proposer is party i

. Thus, we obtain r
i

< r
i

. So, in terms of
the shut-out eect, party i

tends to obtain more rents than party i

.
Next, consider x
i

and x
i

. Since Æ
i

is much greater than Æ
i

, party i

has higher threshold to
vote for or against the proposal than party i

. So, x
i

is greater than x
i

, that is, in terms of the
recipient's-bargaining-power eect, party i

tends to obtain more rents than party i

.
Finally, consider y
i

and y
i

. On the one hand, party i

wants to win party i

's approval
when she is the proposer, because Æ
i

is much smaller than Æ
i
and so party i

's approval is less
costly than party i's one. On the other hand, party i

wants to win party i

's approval when
she is the proposer, because Æ
i

is much smaller than Æ
i
and so party i

's approval is less costly
than party i's one. Since party i

's approver i

is much less patient than party i

's approver i

,
party i

can obtain more rents as the proposer than party i
Æ
, i.e., y
i

> y
i

. So, in terms of the
proposer's-bargaining-power eect, party i

tends to obtain more rents than party i

.
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These three eects aect the continuation values of parties i

and i

in dierent directions.
So, we cannot determine which party's continuation value is greater only from the table. Then,
consider the case that Æ
i

is extremely small. In the case, party i

cannot obtain many rents when
she is not the proposer, and party i

need not distribute many rents to i

when she is the proposer.
So, party i

's advantage in terms of the bargaining-power eect is very signicant. Thus, it is likely
that party i

's advantage in terms of the bargaining-power eect dominates party i

's advantage
in terms of the shut-out eect. Hence, if Æ
i

is extremely small, party i

's continuation value is
greater than party i

's, and otherwise, party i

's continuation value is smaller than party i

's. The
proposition states that the critical value of Æ
i

is equal to
2
3
Æ
i

.
On Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(=;=) of the expression (18) Next, we consider Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(=;=) of the
expression (18). The relationship between (r
i

; x
i

; y
i

) and (r
i

; x
i

; y
i

) is summarized by Table
4, where  is an arbitrary honestly voting MPE in a(Æ).
i

i

r

1
2

1 +
2
Æ
i

 
1
Æ
i

 
1
Æ
i

<
1
2

1 
1
Æ
i

+
2
Æ
i

 
1
Æ
i

x

Æ
i

V
Æ
i

() = Æ
i

V
Æ
i

()
y

1  Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() = 1  Æ
i
V
Æ
i
()
Table 4: r

, x

and y

in case Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(=;=)
This table is explained as follows.
According to the expression (3), when Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(=;=), Æ
i

, Æ
i

and Æ
i
are very similar. That
is, each party is as patient as other party. Thus, all parties claim the same amount of rents. So,
we obtain x
i

= x
i

and y
i

= y
i

.
Since all parties claim the same amount of rents, each party randomizes the choice of which
party to distribute positive rents to. From the expression (2), when she is not the proposer, party
i

is distributed positive rents to with probability
r
i

=
1
2

+

1 

 
2
Æ
i

+
1
Æ
i

+
1
Æ
i
+ 

=
1
2

1 +
2
Æ
i

 
1
Æ
i

 
1
Æ
i

;
and party i

is distributed positive rents to with probability
r
i

=
1
2

 
1
Æ
i

+
2
Æ
i

 
1
Æ
i
+ 

+ (1  )

=
1
2

1 
1
Æ
i

+
2
Æ
i

 
1
Æ
i

:
Therefore, we obtain
r
i

  r
i

=
3
2
Æ
i

  Æ
i

Æ
i

Æ
i

> 0
because Æ
i

> Æ
i

. In short, party i

tends to be avoided since she is more patient.
To sum up, party i

's continuation value is greater than party i

's.
On Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(=; >) of the expression (18) Next, we consider Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(=; >) of the
expression (18). The relationship between (r
i

; x
i

; y
i

) and (r
i

; x
i

; y
i

) is summarized by Table
5, where  is an arbitrary honestly voting MPE in a(Æ).
This table is explained as follows.
According to the expression (4), when Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(=; >), Æ
i

and Æ
i

are very similar. That is,
party i

is as patient as party i

. Thus, party i

and party i

claim the same amount of rents.
So, we obtain x
i

= x
i

. Furthermore, according to the expression (4), when Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(=; >),
Æ
i
is much smaller than Æ
i

and Æ
i

. That is, party i is much less patient than party i

and party
i

. So, when the proposer is party i

or i

, she wants party i's approval, which is less costly than
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1
2
n
3(Æ
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 Æ
i

)
2Æ
i
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Æ
i

+
1
2
o
<
1
2
n
3(Æ
i

 Æ
i

)
2Æ
i

Æ
i

+
1
2
o
x

Æ
i

V
Æ
i

() = Æ
i

V
Æ
i

()
y

1  Æ
i
V
Æ
i
() = 1  Æ
i
V
Æ
i
()
Table 5: r

, x

and y

in case Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(=; >)
another non-proposer party's. Thus, y
i

= y
i

= 1  Æ
i
V
i
(). Therefore, party i

is equivalent to
party i

in terms of the bargaining-power eect.
Next, consider the shut-out eect. Since party i is much less patient than party i

and party
i

, party i

does not distribute positive rents to party i

when she is the proposer, and vice
versa. Party i randomizes the choice of which party to distribute positive rents to when she is
the proposer, because party i

is as patient as party i

and so party i

's approval is as costly as
party i

's. From the expression (29), party i distributes positive rents to party i

with probability
3(Æ
i

 Æ
i
 )
2Æ
i
Æ
i

+
1
2
and to party i

with probability
3(Æ
i
 Æ
i

)
2Æ
i
Æ
i

+
1
2
. Thus, we obtain
r
i

=
1
2

3 (Æ
i

  Æ
i

)
2Æ
i

Æ
i

+
1
2

and
r
i

=
1
2

3 (Æ
i

  Æ
i

)
2Æ
i

Æ
i

+
1
2

:
Therefore,
r
i

  r
i

=
3 (Æ
i

  Æ
i

)
2Æ
i

Æ
i

> 0
because Æ
i

> Æ
i

. In short, party i

tends to be avoided since she is more patient.
To sum up, party i

's continuation value is greater than party i

's.
On Æ 2 
i;i

;i

(>;=) of the expression (18) Next, we consider Æ 2 
i;i

;i

(>;=) of the
expression (18). The relationship between (r
i

; x
i

; y
i

) and (r
i

; x
i

; y
i

) is summarized by Table
6, where  is an arbitrary honestly voting MPE in a(Æ).
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+
1
2
oi
<
1
2
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1 +
n
3(Æ
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)
2Æ
i

Æ
i

+
1
2
oi
x

Æ
i

V
Æ
i

() = Æ
i

V
Æ
i

()
y

1  Æ
i

V
Æ
i

() = 1  Æ
i

V
Æ
i

()
Table 6: r

, x

and y

in case Æ 2 
i;i

;i

(>;=)
This table is explained as follows. According to the expression (5), when Æ 2 
i;i

;i

(>;=), Æ
i

and Æ
i

are very similar. That is, party i

is as patient as party i

. Thus, party i

and party i

claim the same amount of rents. So, we obtain x
i

= x
i

. Furthermore, according to the expression
(5), when Æ 2 
i;i

;i

(>;=), Æ
i
is much greater than Æ
i

and Æ
i

. That is, party i is much more
patient than party i

and party i

. So, party i

wants party i

's approval, which is less costly than
party i's, when she is the proposer, and vice versa. Taking account of the fact that party i

and
party i

claim the same amount of rents, we obtain y
i

= y
i

. Therefore, party i

is equivalent to
party i

in terms of the bargaining-power eect.
Next, consider the shut-out eect. Since party i

and party i

is much less patient than party
i, party i

distribute positive rents to party i

with certainty when she is the proposer, and vice
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versa. Party i randomizes the choice of which party to distribute positive rents to when she is
the proposer, because party i

is as patient as party i

and so party i

's approval is as costly as
party i

's. From the expression (??), party i distributes positive rents to party i

with probability
3(Æ
i

 Æ
i
 )
2Æ
i
Æ
i

+
1
2
and to party i

with probability
3(Æ
i
 Æ
i

)
2Æ
i
Æ
i

+
1
2
. Thus, we obtain
r
i

=
1
2

1 +

3 (Æ
i

  Æ
i

)
2Æ
i

Æ
i

+
1
2

and
r
i

=
1
2

1 +

3 (Æ
i

  Æ
i

)
2Æ
i

Æ
i

+
1
2

:
Therefore,
r
i

  r
i

=
3 (Æ
i

  Æ
i

)
2Æ
i

Æ
i

> 0
because Æ
i

> Æ
i

. In short, party i

tends to be avoided since she is more patient.
To sum up, party i

's continuation value is greater than party i

's.
On Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(>;=) of the expression (19) Next, we consider Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(>;=) of the
expression (19). The relationship between (r
i

; x
i

; y
i

) and (r
i

; x
i

; y
i

) is summarized by Table
7, where  is an arbitrary honestly voting MPE in a(Æ).
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n
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1
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V
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Table 7: r

, x

and y

in case Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(>;=)
This table is explained as follows. According to the expression (5), when Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(>;=),
Æ
i

and Æ
i
are much smaller than Æ
i

. That is, party i

is much more patient than party i

and
party i. So, party i

's appropval is more costly for the proposer than party i

and party i. Thus,
when the proposer is party i

or party i, she does not distribute positive rents to party i

and
does to the non-proposer party but party i

with certainty. Hence, r
i

> r
i

= 0. This implies
that party i

tends to obtain more rents than party i

in terms of the shut-out eect and the
recipient's-bargaining-power eect.
Next, consider the proposer's-bargaining-power eect. According to the expression (5), when
Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(>;=), Æ
i

and Æ
i
are very similar. That is, party i

is as patient as party i. So, party
i

's approval is as costly for the proposer as party i. Thus, when party i

is the proposer, she
randomizes the choice of which party of i
a
st and i to distribute positive rents to. On the other
hand, as mentioned above, party i

distributes positive rents to party i with certainty when she is
proposer. Taking account of the fact that party i

is as patient as party i and so party i

and party
i claim the same amount of rents, we can conclude that y
i

= y
i

. That is, party i

is equivalent
to party i

in terms of the proposer's-bargaining-power eect.
To sum up, party i

's continuation value is greater than party i

's.
On Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(>;>) of the expression (19) Finally, we consider Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(>;>) of the
expression (19). The relationship between (r
i

; x
i

; y
i

) and (r
i

; x
i

; y
i

) is summarized by Table
8, where  is an arbitrary honestly voting MPE in a(Æ).
This table is explained as follows.
According to the expression (6), when Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(>;=), Æ
i

and Æ
i
are much smaller than Æ
i

.
That is, party i

is much more patient than party i

and party i. So, party i

's approval is more
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Table 8: r

, x

and y

in case Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(>;>)
costly for the proposer than party i

and party i. Thus, when the proposer is party i

or party i,
she does not distribute positive rents to party i

and does to the non-proposer party but party i

with certainty. Hence, r
i

> r
i

= 0. This implies that party i

tends to obtain more rents than
party i

in terms of the shut-out eect and the recipient's-bargaining-power eect.
Next, consider the proposer's-bargaining-power eect. According to the expression (6), when
Æ 2 
i

;i

;i
(>;>), Æ
i
is much smaller than Æ
i

and Æ
i

. That is, party i is much less patient than
party i

and party i

. So, party i's approval is less costly for the proposer than party i

and party
i

. Thus, when the proposer is party i

or party i

, she distributes positive rents to party i with
certainty. So, we can conclude that y
i

= y
i

. That is, party i

is equivalent to party i

in terms
of the proposer's-bargaining-power eect.
To sum up, party i

's continuation value is greater than party i

's.
F Lemmata to prove Proposition 3
Lemma 13 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Take any Æ  (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
i;j;k
(=;=). Take any
honestly voting MPE  in a(Æ). Then,
8h 2 fi; j; kg :
@V
Æ
h
()
@Æ
h
< 0:
Proof. Party h's2 fi; j; kg continuation value in  is given by the expression (1). Hence, we obtain
8h 2 fi; j; kg :
@V
Æ
h
()
@Æ
h
=  
Æ
h+1
Æ
h+2
(Æ
h+1
+ Æ
h+2
)
(Æ
1
Æ
2
+ Æ
2
Æ
3
+ Æ
3
Æ
1
)
2
< 0:
Q.E.D.
Lemma 14 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Take any Æ  (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
i;j;k
(=; >). Take any
honestly voting MPE  in a(Æ). Then,
@V
Æ
i
()
@Æ
i
< 0;
@V
Æ
j
()
@Æ
j
< 0;
and
@V
Æ
k
()
@Æ
k
> 0:
Proof. Party i's continuation value in , j's and k's are given by the expression (26), (27) and
(28), respectively. Hence, we obtain
@V
Æ
i
()
@Æ
i
=  
2Æ
j
(1  Æ
k
) (3  Æ
j
  2Æ
k
)
f(3  2Æ
k
) (Æ
i
+ Æ
j
)  Æ
i
Æ
j
g
2
< 0;
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@V
Æ
j
()
@Æ
j
=  
2Æ
i
(1  Æ
k
) (3  Æ
i
  2Æ
k
)
f(3  2Æ
k
) (Æ
i
+ Æ
j
)  Æ
i
Æ
j
g
2
< 0;
and
@V
Æ
k
()
@Æ
k
=
2(Æ
i
+ Æ
j
  Æ
i
Æ
j
)(Æ
i
+ Æ
j
)
f(3  2Æ
k
) (Æ
i
+ Æ
j
)  Æ
i
Æ
j
g
2
> 0:
Q.E.D.
Lemma 15 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Take any Æ  (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
i;j;k
(>;=). Take any
honestly voting MPE  in a(Æ). Then,
@V
Æ
i
()
@Æ
i
= 0;
@V
Æ
j
()
@Æ
j
< 0;
and
@V
Æ
k
()
@Æ
k
< 0:
Proof. Party i's continuation value in , j's and k's are given by the expression (30), (31) and
(32), respectively. Hence, we obtain
@V
Æ
i
()
@Æ
i
= 0;
@V
Æ
j
()
@Æ
j
=  
2Æ
k
(3  Æ
k
)
f3 (Æ
j
+ Æ
k
)  Æ
j
Æ
k
g
2
< 0;
and
@V
Æ
k
()
@Æ
k
=  
2Æ
j
(3  Æ
j
)
f3 (Æ
j
+ Æ
k
)  Æ
j
Æ
k
g
2
< 0:
Q.E.D.
Lemma 16 Suppose that fi; j; kg = N . Take any Æ  (Æ
1
; Æ
2
; Æ
3
) 2 
i;j;k
(>;>). Take any
honestly voting MPE  in a(Æ). Then,
@V
Æ
i
()
@Æ
i
= 0;
@V
Æ
j
()
@Æ
j
> 0;
and
@V
Æ
k
()
@Æ
k
> 0:
Proof. Party i's continuation value in , j's and k's are given by the expression (34), (35) and
(36), respectively. Hence, we obtain
@V
Æ
i
()
@Æ
i
= 0;
@V
Æ
j
()
@Æ
j
=
3 (1  Æ
k
) (3  Æ
k
)
(9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
)
2
> 0;
and
@V
Æ
k
()
@Æ
k
=
(3  2Æ
j
)(6  Æ
j
)
(9  3Æ
j
  6Æ
k
+ Æ
j
Æ
k
)
2
> 0:
Q.E.D.
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